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interest."' Furthermore, the legislature in its zeal to prevent abortion
advertising of any kind has failed to protect the legitimate interests
of the state in regulating the public health and general welfare.
Acts 72 and 76 appear to be unconstitutional. The state should
reconsider its response to the Supreme Court's decisions. Irrespective
of its distaste for the rulings, as evidenced by the numerous concur-
rent resolutions denouncing them, the legislature should concern it-
self with enacting those important, permissible state regulations
which would protect the health of women exercising their fundamen-
tal rights under the constitution.
R. Patrick Vance
PRISONERS' RIGHTS-JAILER'S DUTY OF PROTECTION
Two recent decisions by the Louisiana supreme court, Nedd v.
State' and Parker v. State,' point to a trend throughout the country
to recognize the claims of prisoners seeking judicial enforcement of
their rights.3 Nedd, an Angola inmate, was injured when attacked in
his dormitory by the same prisoner who had been convicted of aggra-
vated battery for an attack on Nedd some ten years earlier. Parker
suffered injuries when he was attacked by an inmate who had pre-
viously threatened him. The issue in both cases was whether under
the circumstances the state should be liable for damages in repara-
tion for the injuries intentionally inflicted by other inmates. Though
recovery was denied in both instances under the facts presented, the
60. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
1. 281 So. 2d 131 (La. 1973).
2. 282 So. 2d 483 (La. 1973).
3. A majority of states now permit inmates to institute civil suits. Even many of
those states that still have civil death statutes forbidding suits in tort provide that
imprisonment is a disability that interrupts the running of prescription. The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929, 1019 (1970). In addition
to the remedy discussed below, an injured prisoner may also have an action under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Protection of inmates against assaults by
other prisoners is included in the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972). Though an
isolated attack upon a prisoner, without special circumstances, is not seen as a consti-
tutional deprivation, a prisoner who is injured by being needlessly exposed to an extra-
hazardous condition may recover under the Civil Rights Act. Roberts v. Williams, 302
F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969). Similarly, if the general conditions at a prison are
insufficient to prevent frequent assaults, the constitutional right of prisoners to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment is violated. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
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possibility of future litigation4 invites a discussion of what affirmative
duty, if any, is owed a prisoner by his custodian.
The proposition that one person is generally not under a duty to
render aid to another or to undertake to protect another from harm5
has several well recognized exceptions. When a person through his
conduct causes another to encounter a perilous situation, it is his
responsibility to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to the other.
If a person is in control of a dangerous environment to which another
has become helplessly exposed, that person may be required to take
steps to protect one who is so endangered. Hospitals,' mental institu-
tions7 and nursing homes8 are obvious examples of instances in which
courts have seen fit to impose such affirmative duties. Common car-
riers,' innkeepers'0 and even storekeepers" are also required to afford
reasonable aid and protection to those to whom they offer their serv-
ices. Likewise a teacher must attempt to prevent any anticipated
harm to his students. 2
The same notions that have led courts to impose a duty of care
in these instances are found in the situation of penal imprisonment.
In addition, several unique aspects of imprisonment strongly empha-
size the need to impose affirmative duties upon those charged with
the custody of prisoners. Many persons with whom a prisoner must
involuntarily associate are of conspicuously violent temperament.
4. The abrogation of the doctrine of governmental immunity by the court in Board
of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises Co.,
273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973), should lead to an increase in the number of suits brought by
prisoners against the state. Formerly legislative approval as provided for in Louisiana
Constitution, article III, section 35 was required. Parker's suit was authorized by House
Concurrent Resolution No. 215, 1970, and Nedd's by House Concurrent Resolution No.
8, 1968 Extra Session.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
6. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 236 Minn. 384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952); Hirsh
v. State, 9 App. Div. 2d 1006, 194 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1959).
7. Gould v. State, 181 Misc. 884, 46 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1944).
8. Bezark v. Kostner Manor Inc., 29 I1. App. 2d 106, 172 N.E.2d 424 (1961).
9. Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 189 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938); Hughes v.
Gregory Bus Lines, 157 Miss. 374, 128 So. 96 (1930).
10. Miller v. Derusa, 77 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); Priewe v. Bartz, 249
Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957); Coca v. Arceo, 71 N.M. 186, 376 P.2d 971 (1962).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 A (1965).
12. Eastman v. Williams, 124 Vt. 445, 207 A.2d 146 (1965); McLeod v. Grant
County Sch. Dist., 42 Wash. 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953). Here the court overruled a
demurrer to an action on behalf of a twelve-year-old school girl raped by several of her
classmates in the school gymnasium during noon recess. The court pointed out that
the relationship between the school district and the pupil was not voluntary, that the
child was compelled to attend school and the protective custody of the teachers is
substituted for that of her parents.
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Not only is a prisoner deprived of the comfort found in familiar,
protective surroundings, but he is also completely denied that most
effective means of protection, flight. In view of these considerations
it is not surprising that, with few exceptions," courts have found
affirmative duties for his aid and protection. 4 The duty to take rea-
sonable steps to protect a prisoner against an unreasonable risk of
intentional harm by another prisoner was first recognized in Louis-
iana in Honeycutt v. Bass. There the court held that the allegation
that a belligerently drunk fellow prisoner was allowed access to the
plaintiff stated a cause of action against the sheriff in charge of the
parish jail for the injuries the plaintiff received when attacked. Since
the danger that one inmate will harm another is prevalent in almost
all instances where men are imprisoned together, a determination
that the risk to a prisoner of this type of harm is to be regarded as
an unreasonable one must be made before special precautions can be
required. 6 It would seem that this determination cannot properly be
made by a jailer who remains in ignorance of the situations under his
supervision. Therefore it has generally been expected that some effort
be made by a jailer to ascertain the extent of the risks to which his
prisoners have been exposed. 7
Where the confinement of prisoners together is only for a brief
period immediately following their arrest, as when they are placed in
a "drunk tank," it is usually not feasible for a jailer to investigate
their propensity for violence."' However, even in these circumstances,
if the custodian has actual knowledge that a certain prisoner is vio-
lently insane 9 or belligerently drunk, 0 this may be enough to induce
the court to find that the custodian had a "reasonable ground to
apprehend the danger"'" of injury and therefore to conclude that he
should have taken steps to protect the other prisoners.
13. Bush v. Babb, 23 Ill. App. 2d 285, 162 N.E.2d 594 (1959); Cocking v. Wade,
87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898); O'Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N.E. 371 (1894).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965).
15. 187 So. 848 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
16. Mobley v. State, 1 App. Div. 2d 731, 147 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1955).
17. Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1969); Browning v. Graves, 152 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1941). The court in Shuff v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 392 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1965), involving a drunken prisoner who fell from his bed, spoke of a
sheriff's "affirmative duty to foresee the anticipated danger." Id. at 395.
18. Middletent v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 788 (D.S.D. 1970); City of Lexing-
ton v. Greenhow, 451 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1970).
19. Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940); Kusah v. McCorkle, 100
Wash. 318, 170 P.1023 (1918)
20. Honeycutt v. Bass, 187 So. 848 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
21. Id. at 851.
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Where the period of imprisonment is a more extended one, it is
appropriate for prison officials to take definite steps in an effort to
obtain knowledge about those under their control."2 An inmate's
criminal record, his mental history, and reports of his conduct while
in prison could be included in a record maintained by prison offi-
cials. 3 The need for such a record to be used by prison authorities in
classifying their prisoners and discovering potential troubles is ob-
vious.2 14 When properly maintained records point out possible dan-
gers, this would compel officials to investigate further.25 Observations
by employees and guards would also afford notice to authorities of
situations that may require their special attention. 21 If authorities are
informed of complaints by inmates, this, on appropriate occasions,
should lead them to attempt to find out whether there is a substantial
basis for these expressions of fear. 27 Even though many complaints
may turn out to be unfounded, some guarantee of genuineness is
afforded them by the risk of arousing antagonism on the part of other
inmates that the prisoner runs in approaching officials with such
matters.
Even if the chance of injury from a recognized risk is known to
prison officials, at what point does this chance reach such proportions
to make special precautions necessary? Since violence is a not un-
common characteristic of prisoners, association with prisoners with
records of violence is generally not enough to create an unreasonable
22. "When a person is under a duty to take precautions against a possible danger,
there is usually an ancillary duty to use care to find out what precautions are needed;
and for the purpose of the principal duty he is charged with all knowledge which he
would have got by properly performing the ancillary duty." Terry, Negligence, 29
HARV. L. REV. 40, 48 (1915).
23. Cohen v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967); Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 225 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1967). See THE AMERICAN PRISON Ass'N., SUGGESTED STANDARDS FOR A STATE
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 21-22 (1946).
24. In Nedd's prison records there was no mention of the earlier attack by his
assailant. While the majority did not discuss this, the dissent viewed this as a breach
of the duty owed to Nedd by prison officials.
25. "He may, furthermore, be engaged in an activity, or stand in a relation to
others, which imposes upon him an obligation to investigate and find out .... " W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 160 (4th ed. 1971). On this point, the dissent
in Nedd also was of the opinion that prison officials were negligent in failing to investi-
gate the danger faced by the plaintiff.
26. St. Julian v. State, 98 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Glover v. Hazel-
wood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
27. In Parker, it was pointed out that the plaintiff's complaints led to a conference
with prison officials and a search for weapons in his assailant's dormitory, even though
prison officials testified to the frequency and often unsubstantiated nature of such
complaints. See also Webber v. Anderson, 187 Neb. 9, 187 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
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risk."' Special knowledge, however, that a prisoner is insane29 or that
a group has been organized to administer its own brand of "justice"'",
should require action by officials to avoid potential liability. Even
short of this, when a grudge or special dislike of one prisoner for
another is brought to officials' attention it may be necessary that
preventive measures be taken.31 Intervention may also be appropriate
where it becomes known that prisoners have weapons, even though
it may be impossible to prevent the fabrication of instruments of
attack .3
Once it is concluded that the risk is one that demands some
action, prison officials are faced with the determination of what ac-
tion should be taken to prevent the possible harm. Isolation of each
prisoner, though undoubtedly the best method of preventing all at-
tacks, 3 may place such an extravagant demand on prison facilities
that only the most extreme situation would justify it. Even if facilities
were adequate, modern penological theories are opposed to the exten-
sive use of isolation.34 The acceptable practice, then, is to quarter all
but the most dangerous inmates in groups.3 5 In determining the mem-
bership of prisoner groups, special care to ensure the safety of inmates
should be taken. For example, the sometimes common practice of
housing homosexuals separately is one whose relationship to safety is
uncertain. While the placement of homosexuals with other prisoners
may create a disruptive influence or leave homosexuals open to vic-
timization,3 the rivalries and jealous disputes that arise in homosex-
28. Fleishour v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
29. St. Julian v. State, 98 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
30. People ex rel. Coover v. Gunther, 101 Colo. 37, 94 P.2d 699 (1939); Lamb v.
Clark, 282 Ky. 167, 138 S.W.2d 350 (1940); Miller v. Owsley, 422 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1967);
Taylor v. Slaughter, 171 Okla. 152, 42 P.2d 235 (1935).
31. The plaintiff in Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969), was
placed in a separate corridor because his life had been threatened. In both of the
principal cases it appears that the attacks were the result of animosity towards the
plaintiff.
32. Fleishour v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (attack with fire
extinguisher, attack with a bible also mentioned); Flaherty v. State, 296 N.Y. 342, 73
N.E.2d 543 (1947) (acid from fire extinguisher used); Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279,
7 S.E.2d 563 (1940) (attack with table leg).
33. Even isolation may not prevent all attacks, as the facts in Upchurch v. State,
51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969), and Burdich v. State, 206 Misc. 839, 135 N.Y.S.2d
548 (1954) show.
34. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 522-24 (8th ed. 1970).
35. Fleishour v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
36. "Prisoners afflicted with homosexual tendencies are a constant source of diffi-
culty for prison officials. Their presence . . . is a disruptive influence, to say the least."
Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 487 (La. 1973).
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ual groups are often the source of serious dangers.:7 When authorities
are aware of tensions within a group that are likely to erupt into
violence, the reasonable course of action may be removal of one of the
antagonists from the group by reassignment to another part of the
prison population or by isolation from all other prisoners. Whether
the situation exhibits such a potentiality for harm as to require the
reassignment of either the possible victim or assailant, rather than
using a less burdensome measure, must be considered by prison offi-
cials.3 1
Several of the easier but frequently less effective measures that
may be employed instead of isolation or reassignment deserve men-
tion. Supervision over potentially dangerous situations can be in-
creased, although this will usually only forestall and not prevent the
threatened harm. There may be a resort to searches to prevent the
acquisition and retention of weapons. Here again, however, the re-
moval of every object that may be used to inflict serious harm cannot
always be accomplished.3" Efforts at reconciliation between feuding
prisoners can be attempted,"' or belligerent prisoners can be informed
that disciplinary measures will promptly follow any show of violence.
However, the relative effectiveness of these various measures when
the threat of assault is immediate must be considered in a determina-
tion of which precautionary steps should be taken. Weighing the
immediacy of the danger against the effectiveness of the different
precautionary measures and the relative burdens they place upon
penitentiary staff and facilities may lead to the conclusion that isola-
tion or separation that denies access to the potential victim is the
only reasonable course of action.
37. In Parker, both the plaintiff and his attacker were quartered in Camp H, the
Angola camp for homosexuals. The apparent motive for the attack was jealousy pro-
voked by Parker's finding a new paramour. See Adams v. State, 247 So. 2d 149 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971) (homosexual dispute).
38. "The administrative decision against isolation was based upon a satisfactory
interview with the prisoners and a fruitless search for weapons. Although by hindsight
we now know that the decision was wrong, hindsight is not the test. To the contrary,
the decision must be tested by the information, alternative courses of action, and
circumstances existing at that time." Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 487 (La. 1973).
See also Nedd v. State, 281 So. 2d 131 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinon); Webber v.
Anderson, 187 Neb. 9, 187 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
39. "The record reflects that the weapon problem is common to all penal institu-
tions. Despite all reasonable precautions, the acquisition of such weapons cannot be
completely prevented." Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 487 (La. 1973). Cf. note 32
supra.
40. A conference between Parker and his attacker was held by prison officials, but
its success was obviously superficial. It is doubtful that many prisons are staffed
adequately enough to make this type of measure effective.
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Since many of the penal institutions throughout the country are
notoriously inadequate, both in terms of staff and facilities, it is often
the case that a prisoner's injuries are not the result of fault on the
part of prison officials but are due instead to the inadequacies of the
institution." The prisoner whose injury is not caused by the individ-
ual shortcomings of those who have immediate control over him, but
instead by the failure of the state to provide its penal institutions
with sufficient resources, usually has no claim against the state.2
This position, not without merit, reflects the judicial hesitancy to
second-guess political decisions. The determination as to how the
limited funds of the state are to be allocated is considered a legisla-
tive function, outside both the authority and the competence of the
judiciary. On the other hand, arguments have been advanced by
some that the state, which has placed its prisoners in their perilous
situation and deprived them of their means of self-protection, should
to some degree be responsible for their safety.43 Although this is pres-
ently a minority position, it indicates a growing concern for the rights
of prisoners and the increased possibility of judicial enforcement of
these rights.
Jim Walsh
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT BUYERS:
LOUISIANA LENGTHENS ITS LONG-ARM
Plaintiff, a Louisiana corporation, which contracted with defen-
dant to furnish engineering services, sought to assert personal juris-
41. "Tragically, plaintiff's injury was the product of an environment in which
violent, disturbed, and sexually abnormal men are crowded into a single prison unit
under conditions that are far less than ideal. As the record shows no degree of caution
can altogether prevent such occurrences." State v. Parker, 282 So. 2d 483, 487 (La.
1973). "We agree, as argued by plaintiff before us, that Hawaii State Prison is very
antiquated and inadequate .... " Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 152, 454 P.2d
112, 114 (1969).
42. Upchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150, 454 P.2d 112 (1969); City of Lexington v.
Greenhow, 451 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Parker v. State, 282 So.2d 483 (La.
1973).
43. "The state's failure to appropriate adequate monies for the state's institutions
to perform their custodial function should not, in this last part of the Twentieth
Century, immunize the state from liability to an inmate who is injured through the
state's lack of reasonable care in furnishing reasonable safeguards for his physical
security while he is in the state's custody and unable to fend for himself." Nedd v.
State, 281 So. 2d 131, 136 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinion). A similar opinion is ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion in Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483, 488 (La. 1973).
1974]
